During the months of war, Hamas published propaganda videos in which one can clearly see how they managed to collect information about forces in Gaza through Chinese drones operated by the IDF, manufactured by Chinese DJI or other companies. The military acknowledges the problem, yet continues using the Chinese product due to its availability rather than Israeli and Western products, which exist in the market and are more secure against hacking.
“The drone world underwent a revolution in the ground forces, but we urgently need another revolution,” said an officer in the Southern Command. “This undermines the IDF’s superiority,” added another officer.
A source knowledgeable in the field explains that Chinese drones have a built-in product that allows someone other than the operator to connect to the drone and download information from it, and even take control of it. This product, which looks like a small suitcase, is sold by the Chinese to Iranians, Russians, and other users.
In fact, it’s a product that can be easily purchased. In Israel, several security measures were implemented to prevent unauthorized connections, but experts in the field explain that despite this, it’s still possible to connect to the IDF’s Chinese drones. The only solution, say the sources we spoke with, is to “purchase Israeli or Western drones.”
The vast majority of drones currently serving in the ground forces came from donations - thousands of drones purchased by Israeli and Jewish donors from around the world. The introduction of drones in the war indeed created a revolution; forces in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria use them to collect information and understand the battlefield situation in a way they never had before, without being dependent on the Air Force. Thanks to drones, hundreds of soldiers’ lives were saved and hundreds of terrorists were eliminated.
But conversely, many drones fell in Gaza and reached Hamas’s hands. The IDF said after several such cases that there was “no concern of information leakage,” but this isn’t true. From the moment the technology is in Hamas’s hands, they study it, including the communication method between the operator and the drone. There are videos online showing IDF forces as documented by the drones of units maneuvering in Gaza. In fact, our drones became Hamas’s intelligence arm, as defined by an officer who fought in Gaza.
The Danger of the Security Breach#
The fact that the IDF removed memory cards from the drones themselves, after these fell into Hamas’s hands with the operators’ documentation, also teaches that the discussed documentation reached Hamas through connection to the drones themselves. The military also estimates that many drones fell in Gaza after they managed to take control of them. The military confirms there were no cases where Israeli drones fell or where they managed to download information from Israeli drones, such as the “Rooster” or “G2.” Another problem is that whoever hacked the drone also knew where its operator was located, and would thus act to harm them.
“We entered the war on October 7 with a gap in the drone field; as a military, we weren’t at this event despite understanding the field. What brought the IDF into the drone world was the field and the donors,” explained an officer working in the field. “Thousands of drones suddenly entered battalions and companies that never dreamed of receiving this means, and it took us time to understand the quantity and capabilities this gives to a maneuvering force. Hundreds of terrorists eliminated with drones that expose them and close the circle.”
But then problems are also revealed. “Pretty quickly, drones start falling. Add to this that we see our products with Hamas and Palestinian factions, we understand we have a problem. We still don’t understand how much - this took time. The terrorists see what we see, and we identify cases of strikes in places where there were drone operators.”
Savings That Could Cost Dearly#
According to the officer working in the field, “Already a year ago, the field and forward headquarters of brigades and divisions raised warning lights, but there’s no change. After some time, they again raise the problem.” According to him, the answer they received is that they won’t bring such a quantity of other drones - that is, Israeli or Western-made ones.
Israel already has the capability to produce quality drones, but for unclear reasons, the IDF doesn’t purchase them in quantities that would fill the maneuvering units, and they can only be seen in “boutique” units, such as Yahalom and special units. It appears that the IDF and Defense Ministry need to change strategy to plan the fastest possible procurement of Israeli and Western drones - which would curtail Hamas’s ability to collect information about forces and would also usually provide better operational capability.
Not only in Gaza - in the past, there were publications that in the Navy disaster in Lebanon in 1997, Hezbollah managed to penetrate unmanned aircraft that were then in IDF service, and thus apparently exposed that naval commando activity that became the Navy disaster.
It appears then that there’s a need for strategic change, as was done for example in Ukraine. At the beginning of the war with Russia, Ukraine barely had drones, certainly not locally manufactured ones. In the first year of war, they mainly used Chinese drones, and then they understood that the Russians were using them against them. Chinese superiority made accessible to the enemy. Gradually they changed strategy and removed most Chinese drones from service and moved to local production, which today reaches about 4,000 drones per month.